概要
公開日: 2026-07-27
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原文
Announcements Our position on open-weights models Jul 27, 2026 A post by Dario Amodei, Anthropic CEO Over the last few days there has been a lot of discussion about open-weights models, especially those from China. Reports suggest that some US officials are considering banning the use of Chinese open-weights models by US companies. In response, many tech companies have signed a letter supporting open-weights models, and some people have even accused Anthropic of wanting to ban open-weights models as a means of protecting our business. Anyone who has read my past writing should know that I don’t regard such bans as a useful measure, but let me state it clearly so that there is no doubt: Anthropic has never advocated for a ban on open-weights models. Open-weights models that don’t have dangerous capabilities are a public good: they don’t cost anything besides the compute needed to run them, and they provide value to businesses, developers, and researchers. Protectionist bans would not address my most serious national security concerns. Specifically, I am worried about two nightmare scenarios. I laid these out in my essay The Adolescence of Technology six months ago 1 , and have held these positions consistently for many years: My primary concern is the risk that authoritarian governments—not solely the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), although the CCP is clearly the most capable threat—build AI models that are more powerful than those built by the US, and use them to achieve permanent military superiority or perpetrate incredibly deep repression of their own people. This concern is widely shared within the US government: Vice President Vance warned in Paris last year that “authoritarian regimes have stolen and used AI to strengthen their military, intelligence, and surveillance capabilities,” and the Intelligence Community’s 2026 Annual Threat Assessment found that “other global powers’ robust progress in AI is challenging US economic competitiveness and national security advantages.” It is irrelevant whether these models are released with open weights, and certainly irrelevant whether they are used by US businesses. In fact, the most dangerous model may be one that is trained in secret and handed only to the People’s Liberation Army for use in drones and the Ministry of State Security for surveillance and repression. My secondary concern is the risk that powerful AI models may be misused to carry out cyberattacks or biological attacks, and may have serious alignment problems . Open-weights models—it does not matter whether they come from China or anywhere else—do potentially present a higher risk than closed models, because it is very difficult to apply guardrails to them or monitor their usage, and once weights are released they cannot be withdrawn 2 . But banning the use of these models by US businesses does nothing to address this risk, because bad actors are unlikely to be legitimate US businesses. It would protect US AI companies from competition, but that has never been my goal. To address these concerns, I do support the following three measures, which I and Anthropic have consistently advocated for: We should not sell powerful chips or chipmaking equipment to China , and we should crack down on the rampant smuggling 3 and workarounds used to obtain access to such chips. China has limited domestic production capacity, and therefore, due to the scaling laws , cannot build more powerful models than the US without US chips. This is the most efficient and direct way to block threat #1, and by hampering the training of models that are out of reach of US law, it also indirectly helps with threat #2. We should crack down on industrial-scale distillation operations . Distillation is a much more compute-efficient process than training models from scratch. It allows China to build much better models than its number of chips would ordinarily enable, and thus partially evade chip bans. Distillation does not allow the CCP to obtain equ